On metatethics
Often I come across scenarios as this. My Christian friend struggles in faith, opens a page in the Bible and encounters a verse giving exactly what they need. My anxious friend has a hard time, consults a life-advisor and finds their fortunes much improved. Knowing statistics and rhetoric I often find myself washed over by a sense of frustration. After all you are in the aware that they are finding false relief, confirmation bias, etc. Sometimes I even conjecture the most aware people feel the most solitude, and are defeated because whereas they need to suffer from a world which runs on these nonsensities, the unaware triumph because they get what they want. Thus ignorance truly is bliss, and the smartest must feel like they are fettered to a pole and must watch middle-aged aunties buy their new magic gemstones 24/7. To some extent kindness operates this way too; I think it is easy to look at the state of the world and decide the incentive of Machiavellianism is worth pursuing. Indeed I think without formative experiences, it is difficult to argue why one should insist on kindness, and therefore the capacity to be mean actually portends a good bringing-up. Only those who choose only account to themselves at the end of the day can live in Sartrean freedom, but probably to the unphilosophical they have obtained their internal freedoms already. Philosophy inherently cannot provide an end; it only allows one to understand their own thoughts better. Thus one envies those who have no such need.
Why choose kind, then? If it leaves one so battered and bruised and bear the bristling brunt of things. For one you must hold onto the hope that the other person also chooses kind. It is only possible to find love in things if both sides enter with kindness. To me love ought to be seen as an infinite good; i.e., it outweighs any possible gain from competing successfully in a bad-faith relationship. To think game-theoretically, I think this aligns well with Jesus’s postulate on turning your other cheek. In a bad-bad interaction, neither side prevails; in a good-bad interaction, you must condition yourself to feel content with being on the losing side, for God promises the eternal kingdom to the meek; in a bad-good interaction you feel the remorse for having mistreated a kindred soul; in a good-good interaction, love. Obviously while typing this one realises to have these value judgments, one must have already considered kindness as an axiomatic good. Then why choose kind? Again, philosophy fails to provide a reason. It is something you simply insist on.
Thus sophistry shouldn’t be seen as a bad word; all rhetoric is like this anyway if you don’t have an ethical pre-commitment. We should then focus on making people experience love, so they can make this choice for themselves, rather than rationalising why. To do this I argue you have an incentive to first be kind; or else you would be imprisoned by your already-available conception of kindness. [I had something to do afterwards and lost my train of thought.]